

[From the Gordon-Conwell Lectures on Apologetics, 1981.]

## A Christian Construction, Part 2.

There is no inherent problem in understanding God's words. Since the fall indeed he, man, is often likely to misunderstand. He is, however, more likely to understand quite well, but refuse to believe. That of course was Paul's position before he was converted. Both misunderstanding and refusal to believe are to be classified under the pedantic category of the noetic effects of sin. The first may sometimes be attributed to the incompetence of the Christian preacher but neither is the result of any inherent inadequacy in language.

As for the language of proclamation, the central truths of the Gospel can be expressed simply. It is also legitimate, even on many occasions, to use a more recondite literary style. God's prophets, if they do not use mythology, nonetheless use metaphors, poetry, and parable. These have literary value, but their meaning can always be expressed in straightforward prose. I have taken this up more at length in the book I had intended as a textbook for this class, the three R book [Religion, Reason, and Revelation]. And some of you have it, and you can see what I said on page 144.

Perhaps the problem of communication has here been somewhat neglected in the effort to defend logical thinking. But if symbols are always adequate simply because the thinker chooses and otherwise meaningless sound or mark to designate his idea, there remains the difficulty of communicating the idea by the means of a symbol to another mind. This is a point dear the heart of Christian empiricists. "Don't you read your Bible?," they ask "Don't you see the words on the page?" Now these question deserve an answer and it shall be given. But note first that the empiricist has a harder time explaining communication than the rationalist or intellectualist has. How can sensation-ism produce a sound that conveys a meaning from one mind to another? Since my sensation is never yours, how can you ever know what the sensation is to which I attach a sound or an ink mark? The empirical apologists usually evade this problem.

St. Augustine, with his Platonic background, did not evade. His discussion constitutes the second half of his tractate *De Magistro*. The good bishop showed, conclusively I should say, that the ostensive definitions of logical positivism's protocol sentences are failures. His solution was, briefly, not that two minds had the same sensations, but that two minds have the same ideas. The ideas are common because Christ is the logos that lighteth every man that comes into the world. In him we live and move and have our being. Malebranche, perhaps not to be followed in every detail, for no one is, used the figurative phrase, "we see all things in God."

Perhaps a modern example will prove useful. Of course, examples are always inadequate, but they help keep the dozing congregation awake. Before World War II, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States discussed naval limitations. The cryptographers in Washington got possession of Japanese documents written in code. Even though the cryptographers knew no Japanese, they were able to decipher the coded information. The reason is that logic is the form of every human mind. The Japanese may not use the arabic numbers, five five three, but whatever characters they use they cannot use the same characters for every number. And incidentally, maybe during this vacation, why don't you get a few books on cryptography. They're very interesting. And if you're ever drafted into the Army or Navy maybe you can get a good position if you know cryptography. Cryptographers are held in high repute and they are very clever people. I have come to two conclusions with regards to cryptograms. First, I am quite sure that the best cryptographers can decipher any code that anybody ever makes. Second, I am quite sure that I can produce a code that no cryptographer can break.

Similarly Champollion deciphered the Egyptian hieroglyphics. And between the ages of 1 and 2, a baby's logical mind can decipher whatever symbolism his mother uses. It's only college students, I may say seminary students, who have trouble with German, French, or Greek. And dialectical theologians with English. Or the present attempt to debase the word evangelical into something that it never meant. This much should be sufficient for the subject of communication. The general Christian public, however, who do not hold doctorates in philosophy, are more interested in an exegetical problem connected with a question previously mentioned, "Don't you read your Bible?"

Dr. Robert L. Reymond of Covenant Seminary in St. Louis, one of two critics who have summarized the position here maintained with commendable accuracy, puts the problem in its clearest terms. He writes, "There are scores of Biblical passages which teach by inference if not directly that sensory experience plays a role in knowledge acquisition." And he gives these various Scriptural references. "It seems to me" (me here refers to Reymond) "it seems to me that he (that's myself) that he will convince many Christians of his position," or "it seems to me before he will convince many Christians of his position, that Clark must explain satisfactorily in another way which is virtually universally taken, literally hundreds of passages of Scriptures which employ the words see, hear, read, listen, and so on." "At this time I am not convinced"(he puts it very modestly doesn't he). "At this time I am not convinced that he is accord with Scripture when he denies to the senses a role in knowledge acquisition and would hope that he would take the Greek skeptics less seriously and the implications in many of the subsidiary axioms of Scriptures more seriously than he does."

Ah, Robert Reymond is a good friend of mine. In fact, I'm on very good terms with all my enemies, I mean my apologetic enemies. I might say that Gordon Lewis out in Denver has

reproduced my point of view more accurately than anyone else. I don't agree with his criticisms of me, but he has understood things very well and he says things very nicely and you can read his book on apologetics in which he has a chapter on me.

[Question from the audience.]

Oh, I forget the title of it. But his name is Gordon Lewis.

[Comment from the audience. - It's called *Testing Christianity's Truth Claims*]

Is that it? Good. I wouldn't remember. It is a good book. There's a book in the bookstore upstairs by Geisler, the title has something to do with epistemology or apologetics or something or other. And he takes up oh three or four or five views of apologetics. And he decides that they are all inadequate. And then, in that book, he fails to give any view of his own. I think he gives it in some other books. But, I would suppose that after writing fifty pages or more criticizing everybody else, you might have expected him at least to give a hint of what he himself holds, but he doesn't do so.

Well, that was a quotation from Reymond. Two pages earlier he cites I John 1:1-3 which is perhaps more pointed than the others. For it says, "that which we have heard, seen with our eyes, our hands have handled, that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you." Do not these words guarantee of empiricism, a system based on experience? I might tell you that I've written a commentary on First John and if you want to get my more extended exegesis of the first four verses I hope you can find a copy of it somewhere and annoy yourself by reading it.

Now, I am willing to exegete such verses and I shall do so, briefly here and more at length in a commentary on First John that should appear shortly but has now appeared. But first there are one or two minor phrases in Reymond's paragraph that call for notice. His words "denies to the senses a role in knowledge acquisition" are vague. For they do not specify what role. And, I have talked with Reymond personally and asked him make it clear what role does he give to sensation. And neither to me in conversation nor in his books does he give any notion of the role sensation plays. There are some things maybe it ... well ... anyhow.

Animals have more acute sensations than human beings, but they know no mathematics, construct no syllogisms, nor do they write narratives. Sensation does not help them in these matters. Sleeping and eating play a role in knowledge acquisition in this life. For without them we them we would not remain in this life. But their role contributes nothing the content of knowledge. Nutrition plays a role, but it is not true that *Der Mensch ist was er ist*. That's a

quotation from, you know, from the fellow in 1836. The forerunner of Karl Marx. Feuerbach. Its so hard for me. *Der Mensch ist was er ist*.

Philosophers who insist on giving a role to sensation in the acquisition of knowledge should first define sensation, which they never do, at least the Christian apologetes never do. Then show how sensation can become perception, which they never do. And presumably how memory images can produce universal concepts by abstraction. If this is not their scheme, and that is the usual scheme in the history of philosophy, if that is not their scheme, and it might not be, then they should describe in detail what their scheme is. It is not enough to speak vaguely about some role or another. Plato gave the senses role of stimulating reminiscence. Presumably this role would not satisfy Dr. Reymond. St. Augustine, though he altered his views as he grew older, gave a different role to sensation, and without too much distortion one may call it a “stimulus to intellectual intuition.” And in addition to this, you might if, I don’t suppose you will, I have written an article on the role of sensation of Plotinus. Well, he gave a role to sensation, but I don’t think Reymond would agree with the role that Plotinus assigned to sensation. You can look up my article if you want to. You’ll find it somewhere or another. And so on. These things ought to be made ...

And also we talking about self-consciousness the other day. Plotinus again wrote six Enneads. An Ennead is a collection of 9 tractates. He wrote 6 collections of 9 tractates, all of which try to explain self-knowledge. I’m not sure he was even was satisfied with what he did. And certainly many other people are not satisfied with it. And if it takes Plotinus 54 tractates to make a poor explanation of self-consciousness, it would seem to me that any Christian apologete ought to take a few pages to explain it. But they don’t.

Well, Augustine and Plotinus and so on assign a role to sensation. But I don’t think it would satisfy Dr. Reymond. It is hard to say whether it would or not, because Dr. Reymond himself does not give any role to sensation. No doubt he believes that there is some such role. But I must have missed the page on which he tells what that role is. Now, it is not necessary for a critic to explain his own view in order to reject the view he is criticizing. But, if one writes on “The Justification of Knowledge,” and that is the title of Reymond’s book, the readers expect a specific explanation.

This ties in with the second defect in the paragraph quoted. He thinks that I take the Greek skeptics too seriously. Of course it is not the Greek skeptics alone that I take seriously. There are also Montaigne, Descartes, Bayle, Hume, and the contemporary experiments in psychology. It would be my desire that Dr. Reymond, with his considerable ability, might take all skepticism more seriously. Responsibility to the task of apologetics demands it. Unfortunately several conservative apologetes, with whose theological views I’m in substantial agreement, seem to me

to have evaded this basic problem. It has been stated clearly in this monograph. I cannot believe it should not be taken seriously.

Just one more minor point. Dr. Reymond's disagreement with my reply to Dr. Nash omits one essential fact. The fact that Dr. Nash does not correctly report my view. He asserts that I hold "man cannot know the contents of the Bible by save through the senses." Now he assigns that to me. If I am correct in assuming Reymond and Nash both reject the view that a sensation can be no more than a stimulus to recollection or intellectual intuition, then Nash does not correctly state my view and hence his deductions from this statement are inapplicable to me.

However, we must get closer to exegesis. Before examining First John 1:1-3 or 1-4 it may be well to note that the word sensation, *αἴσθησις* [*aisthēsis*], occurs only once in the New Testament, Philippians 1:9. Neither King James, Revised Standard Version, New American Standard, or the NIV, none of these translate it "sensation." It does not mean sensation. And, you know, if they want to base a sensation-ist view on Scripture you would think they'd have to find the word sensation somewhere in Scripture. But this is the only place it occurs in the New Testament and here it doesn't mean sensation.

Hebrews 5:14 has *τὴν ἔξιν τὰ αἰσθητήρια*, the faculties of sensation. Some translators have "senses." But clearly the word does not mean "senses" in the sense usually used in the discussions on sensation. Dr. Reymond's book does not explain a theory of language. And I would be the last to assign to him a view of language he does not hold. I only surmise that he rejects the theory of ordinary language by which meanings are fixed by usage. For he seems to use the words see, hear, sense without considering how they are used in ordinary language and in Scriptural language.

What did the Apostle John mean when he spoke of "seeing with the eyes and handling with the hands?" Did he mean *αἴσθησις*, proper sensibles, common sensibles, sensation *per accidens*, or what? In Greek the first word of First John designates the word of life. The first word is the neuter relative pronoun "O. The first word designates the word of life, who in verse four is identified as Jesus. Since the epistle and the gospel have the same author, it is permissible to connect this word of life with the word in John 1:1. And no one should object if we equate this word with him whom Paul calls the power of God and the wisdom of God. This second person of the Trinity is the subject of John's declaration. Can this eternal wisdom be heard with the ears, seen with the eyes, and handle with the hands? Is the second person of the Trinity an object of sense? The word hearing comes first, seeing comes second, this discussion will take them in turn.

As for hearing, one should note that no one can ever hear a piece of music or a line of poetry. And I suppose that sounds very paradoxical to people who haven't studied the weight of water

and the pressure of water in a physics laboratory. You realize, you have never heard a piece of music. Or, you have never heard a line of poetry. Our opponents, who insist on sensation as the origin of knowledge, cannot well object to an instance taken from experience. St. Augustine pointed out that to hear music (or poetry) one must at least perceive the rhythm. But there is no rhythm in a single sensation. Even beyond perception it is necessary to have memory before a line of poetry can be recognized as poetry. A single sound has no rhythm or meter. The first sounds of a line must be remembered until the last sound occurs. Note also that the first sound no longer exists when the last sound sounds. Therefore no one ever senses music or poetry. This Augustinian remark should satisfy any empiricist, but of course it is not exegesis.

As the noun *αἴσθησις* in Scripture does not mean sensation, so too the verb “to hear” does not do so either. Exodus 15:14 says “The people shall hear and be afraid.” The meaning is that the enemies of Israel will understand the danger of being defeated in battle. In Number 9:8 someone might want to insist that God spoke in audible words, but in any case, an understanding of the directions is not found in the vibration of the air or eardrums. Deuteronomy 1:43 indicates that Moses spoke audible words. Of course the people heard, but the verse says they did not hear. What is meant is that the Israelites did not obey.

I was try to show that in Scripture the word “hear” does not refer to a sensation.

Near the top of 146. I guess I was at Deuteronomy 1:43 at the beginning of that paragraph, indicates that Moses spoke audible words. Of course the people heard, but the verse says they did not hear. What is meant is that the Israelites did not obey. 2 Kings says that Amaziah would not hear. Of course he heard. Job 29 says “would not God hear his cry?” Of course God didn’t hear his cry. Other reference also, such as Psalm 3:4 speak of God’s hearing prayers. Obviously the verb “hear” does not designate a sensation. For God has no eardrums to be affected by air vibrations. No sensation is possible in this case. The verse in Job, of course, means that God will not favor the hypocrite by granting his petition. Similarly Psalm 4:1 with its two instances of the verb “hear” has nothing to do with sensation. The language is figurative. Deuteronomy 29 allows a transition from hearing to seeing. The verse refers to “eyes to see and ears to hear.” But does it refer to the sense of sight? The phrase is similar to that of First John, seen with our eyes and our hands have handled. The verse in Deuteronomy says that God did not give the Israelites eyes to see and ears to hear. Does this mean that the Israelites had no eyeballs, retinas, and appendages on the side of their heads? It does not mean even that the Israelites could literally perceive, it says “the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive.” And yet they did perceive. The language is figurative. And means perhaps that they did not understand what God meant or, more likely, that they understood but refused to obey. Hence the language of First John does not necessarily nor plausibly refer to sensation and empiricism.

Genesis 3:5 is not a reference to eyeballs and retina. Genesis 16:4 does not mean eyesight. Even though Psalm 13 refers to death, the word “eyes” is not literal. Similarly, Psalm 119:18, same way. This instance cannot possibly refer to sensation. For what is to be seen is completely invisible. Then, most ridiculous of all, the eyeballs of the Lord on little feet run to and fro throughout the whole earth.

A most interesting event occurs in Daniel 5:5 which says, “in the same hour came forth fingers of man’s hand and wrote (Mene, Mene, Tekel, and Parsin) and the king saw the part of the hand that wrote.” Was this a sensation or an hallucination? Would it have been valid for Belshazzar to infer that he saw a physical hand? The astrology saw the writing, but was this seeing a sensation? Did the writing remain visible on the wall until the Medes broke in and killed Belshazzar? This last question cannot be answered from the text, but it should be clear that Belshazzar’s seeing was not what modern common opinion nor certainly what modern common philosophic opinion calls sensation.

Next, consider a few verses from the New Testament. Acts 28 repeats in Greek the Hebrew phrases of seeing and not perceiving, closing their eyes lest they should see with their eyes. How can this refer to sensations of color? For all visual sensations must be sensations of color and nothing else. In 1 Corinthians 1:26 seeing cannot possibly be sensation. Further Scriptural references may be added. Job 19:26, “I shall see God” cannot be understood as sensation for God is not a colored body. Jeremiah 1, though visions are not the sense of sight. Genesis 2 and 11:31 are not about sensations. Since Moses’ body lay buried on the east side of the Jordan, did Peter see Moses on the mount of Transfiguration? And as for Peter, allow this paraphrase of Matthew “whom do men say that I am?” And Jesus said “Peter, you never arrived at that conclusion through any empirical investigation. It was revealed to your mind by my Father.” Clearly the verb “to see” does not always, perhaps not even usually, refer to sensation. This must suffice for the hundreds of verses to which Dr. Reymond alludes. I hesitantly suggest that his exegesis is defective because of the imposition of an untenable epistemology.

But now First John. As in the Gospel of John, 12;140, here too is there no reference to empirical sensations. The object, the word of life, the reason and wisdom of God is not a physical object and cannot be literally seen and handled. It does not have a color, nor any degree of hardness, wetness, or any quality of touch. Explicitly in First John the object is a truth or proposition, namely “God is light.” This proposition cannot be seen in any literal sense. Therefore since words are arbitrary signs whose meaning is fixed by ordinary language the hundreds of scriptural verbs to which empirical apologists refer do not support the role of sensation which presumably, though they are never clear on what this role is, but presumably those apologists desire to give it.

To finish once and for all with the question “Don’t you read your Bible?,” Abraham Kuyper in *The Work of the Holy Spirit*, and this would be a good book for you to read, its only about 700 pages long. Its very good. But beginning with a quotation from Guido de Bres, says, quote, this is from Abraham Kuyper “that which we call Holy Scripture is not paper with black impressions. These letters are but tokens of recognition. Those words are only clicks of the telegraph key signalling thoughts to our spirits along the lines of our visual and auditory nerves. And the thoughts so signalled are not isolated and incoherent but parts of the complete system that is directly antagonistic to man’s thought, yet enters their sphere.” This analogy may still be too behavioristic, but the main thought is sound. I wanted to read a lecture on what’s his name who wrote *The Clockwork Image*. Mackay.

[comment from audience]

Oh good. Good. That is part of my, just a part of my argument against behaviorism. I’ve written a small book on behaviorism and this idea of an electric circuit which Dr. Mackay uses seems to me to be utterly anti-Christian.

At any rate, I just quoted Abraham Kuyper. For however peculiar my views may seem to you, as they do to nearly everybody else, I point out if you disagree with me you at least have to admit that there was an Abraham Kuyper who said this you see. And so I get you by argumentum ad hominem.

[comment from audience]

One or two other points that Reymond makes are also worthy of mention. I have mentioned that taking the scriptural truths as axiom, all knowledge is deducible from them. In opposition to this, Reymond objects that this limits too much the extent of human knowledge. Reymond argues that if knowledge is limited to scriptural implications, we know nothing at all. Quote “I suggest that this would lead to skepticism if not total ignorance.” Surely this is remarkable, if we know the Bible we know nothing? At the bottom of the page Reymond repeats, “so where am I left? That it would appear with no certain knowledge of anything.” It would seem to me (that’s myself) contrariwise, that if a theologian can deduce 600 pages of theology from Scripture, he knows quite a lot. Of course, he does not know everything. On the view here defended, knowledge is indeed limited. But what epistemology can guarantee omniscience to man? If Reymond will retract this inference to complete ignorance, I am willing to acknowledge that some truths he very much wants to know are not obtainable on my theory. On the previous page, Reymond suggested that the *Westminster Confession* does not restrict knowledge to what can be deduced from Scripture. What’s this? That sentence is correct. On the previous page, Reymond suggested that the *Westminster Confession* does not restrict knowledge to what can be deduced from

Scripture. What those divines as individuals believed I cannot say. There was one 17th century writer, who unfortunately I'm unable to name, who held it possible to be infallible on one point and mistaken on others. His example was the infallible knowledge of a ship captain regarding the approach to a harbor. This hardly seems correct. But whatever the Westminster Divines themselves thought, and whether some of them allowed for more extensive knowledge, Calvin limits knowledge to Scriptural truth.

In the Festschrift, which has been given this crazy title, one quotation from Calvin is given. And in another of my volumes, a second is given. The one in the Festschrift is "I call that knowledge not what is innate in man nor what is by diligence acquired, but that which is delivered to us by the law and the prophets." And however much you disagree with me, and that doesn't bother me in the least, I'm used to that, I hope I'm stimulating you to recognize that if you're going to talk about apologetics and epistemology, you have to be able to define knowledge. And Calvin defined it, and I define it as that which can be deduced from Scripture.

Cannot Calvin support his view by the statement of Paul in Colossians 2:3? "In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hid." If so, then no one will find knowledge elsewhere. Note also the French confession of 1559. It says "The Word contained in these books (the canonical books they mentioned in a previous paragraph) The Word contained in these books is the rule of ALL truth." You can't get truth anywhere except in Scriptures, so don't talk about the trees out on the campus, they are not mentioned in Scripture.

[audience comment]

Ah, that's the truth, I didn't make any mistake about that. The one piece of ignorance with Reymond seems most anxious to press against my view is knowledge of oneself. Self-knowledge has indeed been a philosophical ideal ever since Socrates said "γνῶθι σεαυτόν." It is very difficult. Plotinus' Enneads, the extreme difficulty of which philosophers all acknowledge, can be understood as a gigantic attempt to achieve self-knowledge. Even those who think the idea is possible of attainment, must wonder whether anybody has succeeded. Now Dr. Reymond laments that on my theory, Reymond is unknowable to himself and to everyone else except God. He very correctly and adequately explains my reasons for saying so. I might add that I'd be delighted to know Reymond myself, for he is a most-interesting and gracious conversationalist.

But two factors preclude this desideratum. First, Reymond is not a simply object of knowledge. Reymond is a name given to a very lengthy complex of propositions. On Dr. Reymond's position it must be possible to know some of these propositions without knowing others. On his position, if I dare guess at it, this must be the case. It is only a guess because he never says who or what he is. So perhaps Dr. Reymond does not know himself. This is not too surprising. Therefore,

second, the Scripture says “the heart of man is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. Who can know it?” Did Peter know himself when he said “although all shall offend, yet will not I.” Did Dr. X (whose name I will not put in) who as a young man strenuously championed the inerrancy of Scripture, and later asserted that Paul did not speak the truth in his epistles, did he know himself? Did Mr. X, a good seminary student, a good friend of mine, know that he would die an alcoholic? Did Tragic Z. whom I also knew and was a student of mine, a most faithful servant of the Lord for many years, did he know that he would be a suicide? Who can know himself? Maybe god is merciful in not revealing that knowledge to us.

In addition to the two Scriptural references in the previous paragraph consider Psalm 136, The Psalm as a whole extols the knowledge of God. But in doing so, casts doubt on man’s knowledge of himself. “O Lord, thou hast searched me and known me. Such knowledge is too wonderful for me. It is high I cannot attain to it.” If anyone dislikes this verse, or to put it more politely, dislikes my use of this verse, he should set down on paper the knowledge of himself he claims to know and then demonstrate conclusively how he obtained this knowledge. Otherwise, objections to my view are simply begging the question. The arguments that Reymond and others offer against my position is often plausible. To most people they sound like plain common sense. I mean the objections do, not my views. But sense, not to mention common sense, offers such enormous difficulties, that I must be content with my more limited knowledge.

Furthermore, Reymond himself is not an empiricist, and cannot consistently make use of sensation in constructing his apologetics. His account of Thomas Aquinas attests to this. Then, with reference to Francis Schaeffer, he writes, “Surely Schaeffer is aware that what a man observes is dependent on his religious *pou stou*.” “What Schaeffer observes may not be at all what another man observes.” Yes indeed. Well then how can Reymond, in opposition to my detailed arguments, insist on the infallible givenness of sensation? “Note also that I am not convinced that the world is so self-evidently the world that Schaeffer sees.” Wonderful. Then too, Reymond’s appeal to Scripture alone on the following pages is much to my liking. It is Scripture alone, not the observed phenomenon. And when quotes me in such gracious fashion against my other good friend Montgomery, I fail to see his consistency. And since I hold him in high regard I understand him to have accepted my position in his concluding paragraph of which two clauses are “the authority of the word of the self-attesting Christ of Scripture is the only ground sufficient ultimately to justify human truth claims.” “And until his word is placed as the basis of a given knowledge system, that system remains unjustified and no true assertion within it can be shown to have any meaning at all.” That sounds as if I wrote it, doesn’t it. That’s what Rayburn wrote. I don’t mean Rayburn, I mean Reymond. Two men up there, Reymond and Rayburn and I get them mixed up sometimes. Doesn’t it sound like me?

[Audience - I can’t tell ...]

No, I don't intend you would tell from sound. And when I said "Doesn't that sound like me" I didn't mean sound. If my esteemed colleague, and I do esteem him, wishes to make Scripture the sole basis of all knowledge, and then add on something from a different source, his consistency eludes me. Does he favor a Kantian combination of a priori forms and sensory content? Does he have two a priori forms of receptivity and twelve for spontaneity? This is another way of asking if he can construct an integrated system. Similarly, he must provide a theory of language that not only preserves Biblical inspiration but also shows how black marks on white paper can give us the doctrine of the Trinity. Until he does so, he has no basis for rejecting other views.

Now, for a brief summary or conclusion we might return to the four questions in which Urban sets for the task of language philosophy. First, how is language a bearer of meaning? Second, how is communication possible? Third, what is the relation of logic or language? and Fourth (which seems to be essentially the first question over again) how can language refer to things?

First, language is a bearer of meaning because words are arbitrary signs the mind uses to tag thoughts. Second, communication is possible because all minds have at least some thoughts in common. This is so because God created man a rational spirit, a mind capable of thinking, worshipping and talking to God. God operates through his Logos, the wisdom that enlightens every man in the world. Third, language is logical because it expresses logical thoughts. Not to deny the noetic effects of sin, examples of which are incorrect additions and various fallacies in reasoning, man is still a rational or logical creature and hence he cannot think 3 is 4 or that two contradictories can both be true. Language is therefore built on the laws of logic. The fourth question has the same answer as the first. Such, in brief, is the Christian theory of language. On an earlier page a hypothetical reader asked whether the Bible has any theory of language. And somewhere the answer was given that there are verses which at first sight may not be recognized as such, but which all the same are pertinent. Two of them now provide an appropriate finis. "Sanctify them through thy Word, thy Word is truth." And "anyone who guards my doctrine shall not see death, ever."